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SQUARING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
ADMISSIONS POLICIES WITH FEDERAL




The new debate over affirmative action threatens to severely curtail
the steady increase in student diversity on campuses across the country.
Beginning in 1964, when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act,'
schools of higher education, including law schools, 2 slowly adopted
special admission policies in an attempt to assemble student bodies
diverse in race and ethnicity. These policies generally permit admission
committees to expand consideration of a candidate beyond the tradi-
tional objective admission criteria of grades and standardized test scores
and to consider race, gender, ethnicity and past experience in admission
decisions. Such "diversity admission policies" 3 yield classrooms with
larger racial and ethnic populations than do admission programs that
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the helpful comments of Professors Donald L. Doernberg, Bennett Gersh-
man, Lissa Griffin, Kristine Knaplund, Stuart Madden, Michael Mushlin and Randolph
Scott-McLaughlin and the research assistance of Debra Hope Willens and Stephen Berman.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252, (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1989)).
2. This article will discuss the conflict law schools face when attempting to square
diversity admission policies with admission policies based on test score results and past
academic performance. The scope of this article is limited to law school admissions
because of the nature of the statistical analysis concerning performance on standardized
"objective" tests like the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT). This article is similarly
applicable to any educational selective admission program where admission based on
standardized tests does not yield a diverse student body.
3. Courts, scholars and educators sometimes refer to diversity admission policies as
affirmative action policies since such policies grant preferential treatment in a manner
consistent with the goals of affirmative action programs. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551
(W.D. Tex. 1994); Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education,
79 CAL. L. REv. 1512 (1991); James E. Washburn, Beyond Brown: Evaluating Equality in
Higher Education, 43 DUKE L.J. 1115 (1994).
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primarily consider objective test scores, since some minority students
are less successful on standardized tests. 4
Diversity admission policies are increasingly called into question as
the nation evaluates race-based preference programs. Some define these
programs and policies as preferential treatment, while others consider
them the only viable means of supporting qualified minorities and
women. Recently, two federal courts have struck down race-based
preference programs at institutions of higher education,5 and Senate
Majority Leader Robert Dole announced his plan to eliminate prefer-
ential treatment for women and minorities.6 At the same time, two
federally funded commissions announced findings that women and
minorities are continually under-represented in management areas and
that college enrollment lags for minority applicants.7
The Supreme Court has articulated the constitutional criteria that
race-based preference policies must satisfy under the Equal Protection
Clause, but has not yet approved a diversity admission policy. Instead,
the Court and several lower courts have rejected challenged diversity
programs.8 However, it is possible to construct a diversity admission
policy that satisfies the equal protection criteria identified by the courts.
This article will highlight the legal limitations law schools confront
when adopting diversity admission policies in light of the new judicial
climate that disfavors considering non-traditional race criteria in the
admission decision process. Part I highlights the difficulty law schools
face when trying to admit a fully diverse class under the traditional
4. See infra notes 8-14 and accompanying text. Many scholars have criticized the
LSAT as being culturally biased. See generally Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination
in General Ability Job Testing, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1158 (1991); Leslie Espinoza, Empow-
erment and Achievement in Minority Law Student Support Programs: Constructing
Affirmative Action, 22 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 281 (1989); Portia Y.T. Hamlar, Minority
Tokenism in American Law Schools, 26 How. L.J. 443 (1983); David M. White, An
Investigation into the Validity of Cultural Bias of the Law School Admissions Test, in
TowARDS A DIVERSIFIED LEGAL PROFESSION 66, 81-93 (David M. White ed., 1981); Gary
Peller, Frontier of Legal Thought III: Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (1990);
Thomas J. Ginger, Affirmative Action: Answer for Law Schools, 28 How. L.J. 701 (1985);
John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric
Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOwA L. REV. 313 (1994); Stephanie Wildman, Integration
in the 1980s: the Dream of Diversity and the Cycle of Exclusion, 64 TUL. L. REv. 1625
(1990).
5. See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating a race-based
scholarship program tied to the admissions process); Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603
(5th Cir. 1994)(invalidating a law school diversity admissions policy).
6. Edmund L. Andrews, Courts Stall F.C.C. Program for Women and Minorities,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at A22; Steven A. Holmes, Programs Based on Sex and Race
are Challenged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at Al, A22.
7. Peter T. Kilborn, For Many in Work Force, "Glass Ceiling" Still Exists, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at A22.
8. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Podberesky f]; Podberesky
v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Podberesky Il]; Hopwood v. Texas,
861F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
[Vol. 22, No. 4
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application process. Part II discusses the judicial response to voluntary
diversity admission policies and other race-based preference policies
and defines the appropriate standard for court review. Part III proposes
a model diversity admission policy. Part IV analyzes this model policy
under the Court's strict scrutiny test.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Conventional law school admission procedures rely heavily on an
applicant's Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) and undergraduate
grade point average (UGPA).9 Statistics reveal that minority law appli-
cants often do not perform as well on the LSAT as do their non-
minority counterparts. 10 Thus, when law schools set an LSAT or UGPA
9. See Robert Kiltgaard, Merit at the Right Tail: Education and Elite Law School
Admissions, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (1986)(book review). All law schools accredited
by the American Bar Association (ABA) are required to use the LSAT or a similar test
in the admissions process. See ABA STANDARnS (1994). The LSAT is used by all accredited
law schools as an admissions indicator. See Ginger, supra note 4, at 706.
Most law schools use an admissions index calculated by the Law School Admissions
Service (LSAS), combining a student's LSAT score, UGPA and undergraduate ranking.
See Ginger, supra note 4, at 704-05. Most law schools set a minimum index number
below which non-minority students may not be admitted. The LSAT combined with the
UGPA seems to be fairly predictive of Law School success. LSAC RESEARCH REPORT SERIES
PREDICTIVE VALIIrrY OF THE LSAT [hereinafter LSAC REPORT]. See also Hanlar, supra note
4, at 494 (LSAT increased school's ability to predict who would succeed in first year of
law school). Although some criticize the LSAT, others contend that "the LSAT is a good
predictor of the rate of completion of law Study." Developments: Minority Attrition in
Law School, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 144 (1987).
At a minimum, law students with similar UGPAs and LSATs seem to perform in a
similar academic range. LSAC REPORT, supra note 9. "The LSAT is used because it
predicts first-year grades, and does so about as well for minority students as for whites."
Ginger, supra note 4, at 706.
10. At most institutions, minority students present LSAT scores which rank below
the majority students. Anthony Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action,
1988 B.Y.U. L. REv. 343, 353 n.54 (1988). For example, in 1994, the average LSAT score
of African American applicants was a 149 as compared to a 158 for Caucasian students.
The average UGPA of African American students was 2.91 as against 3.25 for Caucasian
students. Telephone Interview with Robert Carr, Director of Data Services, Law School
Admissions Council (June 12, 1995). Moreover, Caucasians, as a group, comprised 86%
of the applicants achieving a 160 or above on the LSAT while only 14% of all minorities
achieved a 160 or above.
The average LSAT and UGPA of students registered in ABA law schools for 1988-89 and
1993-94 were:
1996]
HeinOnline  -- 22 J.C. & U.L. 897 1995-1996
898 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
range for admittable students, proportionally fewer minority candidates
meet these standards than do their "majority" peers. These admission
practices do not yield a diverse entering class. 1
In response to the lack of diversity that an objective admissions
standard yields, most law schools have established special admission
policies to open the application process to minority students with less
competitive LSATs or UGPAs.1 2 The practice has been to deviate from
the standard LSAT/UGPA formula and to consider race, ethnic heritage
or national origin as an additional criterion for admission. 3 This has
Ethnic Number LSAT UGPA
Classification of Applicants '88-89/'93-94 '88-89/'93-94
'88-89 /'93-94
American Indian 198 320 31.1 154 3.00 3.09
African American/ 2,433 3432 28.1 149 2.82 2.94
Black
Caucasian/White 35,108 33,174 35.9 158 3.19 3.25
Chicano/Mexican 444 710 31.6 154 2.99 3.09
American
Hispanic 1,030 1357 32.3 154 3.06 3.13
Pacific Islander/Asian 1,445 2618 35.0 157 3.17 3.24
Puerto Rican 212 591 30.9 148 3.00 3.14
LAw SERVICES MINORITY DATA BOOK 47, Table V-I (Law School Admissions Services Inc.,
1990); Telephone Interview with Robert Carr, Director of Data Services, Law School
Admissions Council (June 12, 1995). Compare sources cited, supra note 4.
11. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
12. Law schools have created affirmative action admission policies since 1968. Scan-
lon, supra note 10, at 363. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 112 S. Ct. 2727
(1992) (noting that although Title VI requires higher educational institutions to remedy
prior segregation regarding admissions policies, hiring decisions remedial programs and
special recruitment, it is the admissions policies that really help to diversify).
13. See Henry Ramsey, Affirmative Action at American Bar Association Approved
Law Schools. 1979-1980, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 377, 411-12 (1980); Ann Kornhauser, Success
Breeds Tension; Georgetown a Pioneer in Minority Recruitment, LEGAL TIMES p.10 (Apr.
22, 1991)(highlighting Georgetown University's decision to consider more than UGPAs
and test scores in admitting students and the school's affirmative action program). In
response to concerns regarding fairness, schools are experimenting with new ways to
achieve diversity among their students. The University of California at Berkeley has
developed a socioeconomic approach that places more emphasis on class than race.
Stanford University gives special consideration to minority applicants once basic academic
and personal achievement requirements have been met, as well as to athletes and children
of alumni, faculty and staff.
A different standard in college athletics now has become accepted. In 1981 when
Patrick Ewing, a seven foot basketball center, was admitted to Georgetown University,
no significant protest resulted over the possibility he was taking another more qualified
student's spot. Georgetown admitted Ewing despite an acknowledged reading and writing
problem and stipulated that daily tutoring, including reading, explaining of material,
and assistance in writing and proofreading papers be provided. David S. Broder, Is this
Affirmative Action?, WASH. PosT, Mar. 8, 1981, at C7 (Op-ed).
[Vol. 22, No. 4
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stimulated judicial and administrative challenges by non-minority ap-
plicants to whom law schools have denied admission.14
As long as schools place primary importance on objective criteria
standards for admission, they will be unable to diversify their entering
classes. Furthermore, diversity admission policies potentially violate
Equal Protection. The challenge for law schools is to construct a policy
that meets the goals of diversity without violating the rights of others.
Legislators' recent efforts to abolish affirmative action policies threaten
law schools' ability to satisfactorily diversify the classroom.
15
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Supreme Court's Review of a Diversity Admission Policy:
Regents of the University of California v. BakkeR
Law school diversity admission policies are challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause on the grounds that the policies grant prefer-
14. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Tex. 1994). See also infra text
accompanying notes 132-41; Office of Civil Rights Letters of Findings, Case No. 01-93-
2005 (1993)(non-minority applicant unsuccessfully challenged University of Connecticut
Law School's voluntary diversity admission policy); Office of Civil Rights Letters of
Findings, Case No. 01-92-2083 (1992)(Asian students unsuccessfully challenged Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology admission policy as discriminatory for setting minority
goals that excluded Asian students where Asian students were most populous group of
admitted students).
15. See Jeff Leads, Jackson Urges Students To Back Affirmative Action, L.A. TIMES,
June 10, 1995, at B1; Abigail Thernstrom, A Class Backwards Idea: Why Affirmative
Action For the Needy Won't Work, THE WASH. POST, June 11, 1995, at C01. One state
has taken non-legislative action towards abolishing affirmative action. On July 20, 1995,
the University of California Board of Regents adopted two resolutions that have the
potential to change the future of the University of California school system. In response
to California Governor Pete Wilson's call to eliminate affirmative action in education,
the Board of Regents voted on resolutions entitled "Policies Ensuring Equal Treatment"
in relation to admissions to University of California schools and the University's em-
ployment and contracting practices. Cal. Bd. of Regents Res. SP-1 & SP-2 (July 20, 1995).
Resolution SP-1 prohibits the University of California from "using race, sex, color,
ethnicity or national origin as criteria for admission to the University or to any program
of study" after January 1, 1997. Cal. Bd. of Regents Res. SP-1, § 2 (July 20, 1995).
Furthermore, not more than 75% or less than 50% of any entering class shall be admitted
based solely on grades. Id. § 5. The Board of Regents may consider economic disadvantage
or other anti-social influences against an individual. Id. § 4. The resolution passed by a
vote of 14 in favor, 10 against and 1 abstention.
Resolution SP-2 mandates that as of January 1, 1996, race, color, sex, ethnicity, and
national origin can no longer be used as criteria in employment and contracting practices.
Policy Ensuring Equal Treatment-Employment and Contracting, Cal. Bd. of Regents Res.
SP-2 (July 20, 1995). The resolution passed 15 in favor, 10 against. Id.
The University of California School system is the first in the nation to take such steps
towards revamping affirmative action programs. See Amy Wallace & Dave Lesher, UC
Regents, in Historic Vote, Wipe Out Affirmative Action Diversity, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
1995, at Al. Commentors speculate that enforcement of the resolutions will drastically
decrease, the number of Black and Latino students at the Universities. Id. Conversely,
the Asain student population will rise. Id.
16. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
19961
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ential treatment to some applicants. The Court has formulated equal
protection tests that vary depending on the particular class of persons
to which the challenged program allegedly grants preferential treat-
ment. 17 Where a policy grants benefits to a particular group based on
race, it is inherently suspect and is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.1 s
Such was the case in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
where a plurality of Justices found the need to consider the Davis
medical school admission policy under the "strictest scrutiny" since it
provided a quota for minority applicants.
Allen Bakke, a white male, unsuccessfully applied for admission to
University of California at Davis (Davis) Medical School in 1973 and
in 1974.19 He challenged the school's 1973 admission policy, adopted
17. The Court has adopted three levels for reviewing equal protection challenges: a
rational basis or rational relationship standard, an intermediate standard, and a strict
scrutiny standard. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th
ed. 1991).
Under the rational basis standard, the Court must determine that government action
has a rational relationship to a legitimate interest of government. The Court uses this
standard to review a government classification under the equal protection guarantee when
that classification is related to welfare benefits, property use, or business or personal
activity that does not involve a fundamental constitutional right, suspect classification,
or the characteristics of alienage, sex, or legitimacy. See Cleland v. National College of
Business, 435 U.S. 213, 98 S. Ct. 1024 (1978) (considering restrictions on educational
benefits of veterans); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 106 S. Ct. 2727 (1986) (considering
eligibility restrictions of Food Stamp Benefits); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.
Ct 2376 (1981) (considering the restriction of private property use under the Federal
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S.
117, 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978) (considering state control of retail gasoline price).
A reviewing court will uphold a challenge under the intermediate standard of review
if it finds that the classification bears a substantial relationship to an important interest
of government. The court will use the intermediate standard when reviewing gender and
illegitimacy cases. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251 (1971) (considering
gender preference in Idaho probate statute); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct.
1910, 1914 (1988) (considering paternity action on behalf of an illegitimate child). Prior
to Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), courts used this standard in reviewing
federal racial affirmative action cases. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S
547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990) (considering a minority preference policy in awarding new
licenses).
The Court now uses the strict scrutiny standard to review government classifications
based on race or national origin. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (considering a federal
minority business preference program); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109
S. Ct. 706 (1989) (considering local government ordinance granting preference for city
contract awards based on race).
18. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). See also infra text accompanying notes 52-82.
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276, 98 S. Ct. at 2741. In 1973, Mr. Bakke received a benchmark
score of 468/500, but his application was late, and after his application was completed,
no applicants in the general admission pool were admitted with a score below 470/500.
At that time four seats in the special admission program were open, although Mr. Bakke
was not considered for these seats. Id. at 276, 98 S. Ct. at 2741. Mr. Bakke wrote to the
Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, Dr. George H. Lowrey, to
[Vol. 22, No. 4
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in an effort to diversify its entering class, on the grounds that it operated
to exclude him from the school on the basis of his race. Bakke chal-
lenged the policy as violative of the Equal Protection Clause,2° the
California Constitution, 21 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VI).22 Davis' admission policy divided applicants into two groups.
One group was comprised of non-minority applicants who had achieved
a minimum 2.5 UGPA, while the other group contained all minority
applicants.23 The school set aside a certain number of seats for appli-
cants in each of the groups. 24 Individuals from the general applicant
protest the admissions quotas. In 1974, Mr. Bakke applied early and received high marks
from a student interviewer, but received low marks from the faculty interviewer who,
coincidentally, was Dr. Lowrey. Dr. Lowery gave him his lowest score of 86, making his
total score 549/600. (There was one additional interviewer in 1974, so the total score
was 600, as opposed to 500 in 1973.). Under the special admission program, applicants
were admitted with significantly lower credentials than Mr. Bakke. Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct,
at 2741.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
21. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7, reads:
No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be
altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class
of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms,
shall not be granted to all citizens.
22. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1989), reads:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274-75, 98 S. Ct. at 2739-40. Each applicant in the non-
minority group was evaluated on the basis of his or her UGPA, MCAT score and
observations made during a personal interview conducted by a member of the Admissions
Committee. The Committee automatically rejected non-minority applicants whose UGPA
fell below 2.5. In contrast, the committee referred minority student applications to a
Special Admissions Committee comprised mainly of members of minority groups. This
Committee rated minority applicants in a manner similar to the applicants in the general
applicant pool, except that a 2.5 UGPA did not serve as a ground for summary rejection.
Thus, all minority applicants were considered for admission by the Special Admissions
Committee, regardless of their UGPA. Id.
With the exception of the minimum UGPA for non-minorities, students were evaluated
for admissions based on the same general criteria. However, each of the two Admissions
Committees operated in a vacuum and did not compare its applicants to the other
applicant group. The Special Admissions Committee did not rate or compare minority
applicants to the non-minority applicants but could accept or reject applicants based on
failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. The Special Admissions
Committee continued to recommend applicants until the number set by faculty vote were
admitted. Id. at 273-75, 98 S. Ct. at 2739-40.
24. Id. at 275, 98 S. Ct. at 2740. In 1968, when the overall class size was 50, the
faculty set aside eight seats for minorities. In 1971, the overall class size was expanded
to 100, and in 1973, the number of seats set aside for minorities was expanded to sixteen.
Id.
1996]
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pool could not fill seats from the minority applicant pool, even if seats
were available.25
When Davis rejected Bakke in 1973, four seats reserved for applicants
from the minority pool were unfilled while the seats for the general
admission pool were filled.26 Davis rejected Bakke again in 1974 al-
though the school accepted minority applicants with lower test scores. 27
Following the second rejection, Allen Bakke sued Davis and the Regents
of the University of California in state court. 28
The trial court found that Davis' admission policy was a racial quota
and held that it violated the California and United States Constitutions,
as well as Title VI. 29 The California Supreme Court affirmed. Applying
strict scrutiny, it concluded that the program violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it was not the least intrusive means of achieving
the school's compelling goals. The court further found that the program
did not pass state constitutional scrutiny or the Title VI challenge. 30 A
majority of the court concluded that an entity is prohibited from
considering race in programs that use government funds .3 1 Thus, the
court ordered Davis to admit Bakke into its medical school. Upon the
state's appeal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 32
The Supreme Court, considering both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI, affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision. 3 3 How-
ever, the Court was sharply divided. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun concluded that Title VI permits federally funded entities
to enact programs or policies that assist minority groups to gain equal
access to programs more easily available to Caucasians. 34 However, Title
25. Id. at 272-76, 98 S. Ct. at 2738-40.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct. at 2741.
28. Bakke sued for mandatory injunctive and declaratory relief. Id. at 277, 98 S. Ct.
at 2741-42.
29. Id. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court emphasized that minority applicants
in the program were rated only against one another and that 16 places out of the class
of 100 were reserved exclusively for minorities. Id. at 278-79, 98 S. Ct. at 2742.
30. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152 (1976). The California
Supreme Court ordered UC-Davis to admit Mr. Bakke to the Medical School, since the
school was unable to demonstrate that the plaintiff would not have been admitted in the
absence of the challenged program. Id. at 1172.
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, 98 S. Ct. at 2753.
32. Id. at 281, 98 S. Ct. at 2743.
33. Bakke at 271, 98 S. Ct. at 2738. A majority of the Supreme Court agreed that
Davis must admit Bakke. At the Supreme Court level, UC Davis maintained that there
was no private right of action under Title VI. Id. at 282, 98 S. Ct. at 2744. However,
although the Court reached its decision based on the Equal Protection argument, it still
recognized that a private right of action might exist under Title VI. Because the issue
was not argued or decided below, the Court chose not to address "this difficult issue."
Id. at 283, 98 S. Ct. at 2745. The Court also did not address the issue of whether private
plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing legal
action. Id. at 283-84, 98 S. Ct. at 2745.
34. Id. at 325, 98 S. Ct. at 2766.
[Vol. 22, No. 4
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VI and the Civil Rights Act do not take precedence over the Constitu-
tional protection of the Equal Rights Clause and thus such programs or
policies are valid only to the extent that they are coterminous with the
Fourteenth Amendment.35
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, acknowledged the need to
ensure that Title VI programs do not violate the rights of Caucasians,
but found that the Davis program violated the Equal Protection Clause.31
Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist joined
in his conclusion that the program was invalid. Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist, however, did not consider
the constitutional issue since they concluded that the program violated
Title VI. 37 Thus Justice Powell cast the "swing" vote and wrote the
plurality opinion.
The proper standard of review for the Davis program was of signifi-
cant concern to the five Justices who considered the program on
constitutional grounds. Those Justices concluded that the Davis policy
included "a classification based on race and ethnic background" be-
cause the policy permitted the Davis admission committee to treat
applicants differently based on race. 38 Justice Powell's opinion pointed
out that programs or policies with "benign ''  3 racial classifications are
only permissible if they withstand the Court's exacting scrutiny.40 Thus,
he would have permitted the Davis admission policy if it were "pre-
cisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."4 1
35. Id. The Justices would have found that the Davis program did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
36. Id. at 320, 98 S. Ct. at 2763.
37. See generally id. at 408-22, 98 S. Ct. at 2808-14.
38. Id. at 289, 98 S. Ct. at 2747.
39. The Court has written that "benign carries with it no independent meaning, but
reflects only acceptance of the current generation's conclusion that a politically acceptable
burden, imposed on particular citizens based on race is reasonable" to correct for general
discrimination. Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 564-65, 610, 110 S. Ct.
2997, 3008-09, 3033 (1990). For an in-depth discussion of benign racial classifications,
see Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, Morality, 22 U. CONN. L.
REv. 323 (1990).
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290, 98 S. Ct. at 2748. The Petitioners argued that the
affirmative action admissions policy should not be subject to strict scrutiny since it was
challenged by a white male and not by a member of a historically discriminated class of
people. Justice Powell disagreed with this theory, recognizing that although the laws of
discrimination are founded on a "two-class" theory of Black and White Americans, the
Equal Protection Clause assures all persons the protection of equal laws regardless of the
status of their particular racial or ethnic group. Id. at 294-95, 98 S. Ct. at 2750-57. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070-71 (1886). In their
concurrence, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell,
adding that the affirmative action admission policy did not mandate strict scrutiny but
that such a program is permissible if the court finds "(1) that there has been some form
of discrimination against the preferred minority groups by society at large and (2) that
there is no reason to believe that the disparate impact sought to be rectified by the
program is the product of such discrimination." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 365-69, 98 S. Ct. at
2786-88.
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, 98 S. Ct. at 2753. Justice Powell also wrote that "in
1996]
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Justice Powell found a compelling governmental interest existed in
attaining a diverse student body. 42 A diverse student body contributing
to a robust exchange of ideas is a constitutionally permissible goal on
which a race-conscious university admissions program may be predi-
cated. 4 3 However, although the Constitution does not bar admission
policies from introducing race as a factor in the selection process,
Powell wrote that preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination on its own.44 The
Davis admission policy, which set aside a specific number of seats for
students in identified minority groups, unfairly benefited the interest
of a victimized group at the expense of other innocent individuals, and
therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 45 Additionally, its prac-
tice of having separate admissions sub-committees review minority and
non-minority candidates inappropriately insulated applicants from com-
order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or
interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the
classification is 'necessary . . .to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding
of its interest." Id. at 305, 98 S. Ct. at 2756 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-
22, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2854-55 (1973)). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 87 S.
Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967); McGlaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 196, 85 S. Ct. 283, 290-91
(1964).
42. Attainment of a diverse student body is related to academic freedom. Bakke, 438
U.S. at 311-12, 98 S. Ct. at 2759-60.
43. Id. at 311-12, 98 S. Ct. at 2759-60. Justice Powell noted that educational excellence
is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. Id. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at
2762.
44. Id. at 307, 98 S. Ct. at 2757 ("We have never approved a classification that aids
persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other
innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations.").
Title VI clearly establishes that where there is a need to overcome the effects of past
racially discriminatory or exclusionary practices engaged in by federally funded institu-
tions, race conscious action is required to accomplish the remedial objectives of Title VI.
Id. at 307-09, 98 S. Ct. at 2757-58. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
agreed with this, stating that "(Title VI] does not bar the preferential treatment of racial
minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such
action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 328, 98 S. Ct. at 2767.
45. Id. at 307, 98 S. Ct. at 2757. Justice Powell upheld the California Supreme Court's
decision that the special admissions program was unlawful, and that Mr. Bakke was to
be admitted to Medical School, but reversed the decision enjoining the Medical School
from considering race in admissions. Id. at 325, 98 S. Ct. at 2766. Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, in a concurring opinion, agreed that the
policy was unlawful because it unfairly favored one group over another. Id. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the holding and dissented in
part, as they did not believe that Allen Bakke should be admitted to the Medical School
or that quotas should be maintained. Id. at 379, 98 S. Ct. at 2793. They joined in Parts
I and V-C, and White joined in part 11-A. Id. at 328, 98 S. Ct. at 2767. Along with
Justice Powell, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun upheld the use of race
in the admissions process, while Justices Burger, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Stewart con-
sidered the issue irrelevant to this case. See RON SIMMONS, AFFIRMATIVE AcTION: CONFLICT
AND CHANcE IN HiHER EDUCATION AFrER Bikke 1-2 (1982).
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parison against the entire admissions pool.4e For these reasons, Justice
Powell concluded that the Davis admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause and therefore was constitutionally impermissible.
Justice Powell's opinion did not preclude schools from considering
race as a factor in instances where a program is free from clear racial
preference or goals. Race or ethnic background may be considered a
"plus" in the admissions process. 47 Thus, although Powell invalidated
the program, his opinion makes clear that he would not necessarily
invalidate all affirmative action admission programs. 48
Although the Court invalidated the Davis admission policy, a majority
of the Court agreed that there are certain instances where race-based
preference policies or affirmative action policies are permissible. Justices
Brennan, White, Blackmun and Marshall agreed with Justice Powell
that there is a compelling interest in ameliorating or eliminating, where
feasible, the disabling effects of identifiable discrimination. 4 9 Encour-
aging diversity in the student population is a compelling interest that
is sometimes permissible even if such action results in unequal treat-
ment. 50 The Court reasoned that the non-minority student would greatly
benefit, and his or her educational training would be enhanced, by
having the opportunity to learn, study and discuss academic informa-
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
47. Id. at 317, 98 S. Ct. at 2762. For example, assume two applicants, one minority
and one non-minority, have the same UGPA and MCAT scores. Under Justice Powell's
opinion, an admissions committee can offer admission to the minority applicant before
it offers admission to the non-minority applicant since a diversity viewpoint "plus"
UGPA and MCAT score is of more value to the school than a non-diversity viewpoint
and the same "objective" test scores.
48. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that
the State has a legitimate interest in an admission program that includes the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin. The Justices disagreed with Justice Powell's
conclusion and held that the Davis policy survived strict scrutiny. Thus, according to
the dissenters, there are certain instances where federally funded entities can enact race-
based programs. Davis' purpose of "remedying the effects of societal discrimination ...
where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority under-representation [in the
medical profession] is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimi-
nation is impeding access of minorities to the Medical School" is a sufficient compelling
governmental interest. Id. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 2784. Justice Brennan wrote that "no
decision of this court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be
colorblind." Id. at 336, 98 S. Ct. at 2771. In his opinion, Congress would not have
adopted the Civil Rights Act, which encourages the elimination of discrimination, while
at the same time "forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious remedies to cure
acknowledged or obvious statutory violations." Id. The Court has held that under certain
circumstances the remedial use of racial criteria is not only permissible but is required
to eradicate constitutional violations. See Board of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 91 S.
Ct. 1284 (1971(invalidating a statute forbidding the assignment of students to school on
the basis of race because it would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to
accomplish desegregation in the school).
49. Balde, 438 U.S. at 325, 98 S. Ct. at 2766.
50. Id. at 307, 98 S. Ct. at 2757.
19961
HeinOnline  -- 22 J.C. & U.L. 905 1995-1996
906 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
tion with students from diverse backgrounds. 5 1 However, while race-
based programs are sometimes permissible, a majority of the Court held
that specific goals or quotas are always impermissible to achieve di-
versity or to dismantle past discrimination.52
Bakke gave some guidance to educational institutions aiming to
dismantle the effects of discrimination. 3 A majority of the Court rec-
ognized the University's right to select students who would best con-
tribute to the "robust exchange of ideas. ' ' 54 In this light, the Court
viewed the Davis admission policy as seeking to achieve a goal that is
of paramount importance to the fulfillment of its mission and, in fact,
as serving an important governmental interest. 55 However, ethnic di-
versity is only one element in a range of factors a university may
properly consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student
body.56
B. The Supreme Court's Current Strict Scrutiny Test
Since Bakke, the Court has not reconsidered the constitutional valid-
ity or the appropriate level of review for race-based admission policies.- 7
51. Id. Students with pro-civil rights voices are silenced by professors who speak to
the contrary and do not call on them. Students need to hear in the classroom about "law
in everyday terms and fit to human needs" and not about "law insulated from cultural
and intellectual diversity, and law focused on cumbersome sieges to the Constitution
rather than on personal accountability and responsible, legal administration." Dennis
Graham Combs, Preachers of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at E19.
52. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
53. Id. at 316-17, 98 S. Ct. at 2761-62. "[Tlhe attainment of a diverse student body
... is a constitutionally permissible attainable goal for an institution of higher education."
Id. at 311-12, 98 S. Ct. at 2759.
54. Id. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 2760
55. Id.
56. Id. at 314, 98 S. Ct. at 2760. The Court acknowledged that the importance of
diversity may be greater at the undergraduate level than at the medical school level,
where the focus is on "professional competency," but concluded that the "contribution
of diversity is substantial" even at this level, because doctors provide services to a
"heterogeneous population." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313-14, 98 S. Ct. at 2760. The Court
also noted that while law schools focus on gaining legal skills and knowledge, this focus
"cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the
law interacts ...." Id. at 314 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634, 70 S. Ct.
848, 850 (1950)).
57. Since Bakke, courts rarely have heard challenges against schools claiming that
an affirmative action admission policy violated Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause.
A plaintiff did not have standing unless he or she could prove actual harm. The Court
recently relaxed the standing requirement. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Asso-
ciated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993), the
Court determined whether a Jacksonville program requiring that ten percent of all
construction contracts go to Minority Business Enterprises was constitutional. The chal-
lenge was brought by the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Con-
tractors of America (Northeastern). The City of Jacksonville argued that Northeastern did
not have standing, as it could not show actual harm. The Court held that in cases where
members of one group were made to have a more difficult time obtaining benefits, the
members of that group did not have to show an injury in fact. Instead, in order to prove
[Vol. 22, No. 4
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However, through a series of cases considering the validity of race-
based preference programs in the employment context, the Court has
articulated a clear definition of strict scrutiny. The current test has
evolved from Bakke, which held that a race-preference program survives
strict scrutiny if it is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling inter-
est," 5 8 to the present day test of evaluating whether the program is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
5 9
In 1987, the Court more clearly articulated the strict scrutiny test for
race-based programs in the workplace in United States v. Paradise.6 0
Paradise considered the constitutionality of a one-black-to-one-white
promotion plan that the Alabama Department of Public Safety adopted
pursuant to a district court consent decree. The consent decree required
the Department of Public Safety to institute this plan as an interim
measure to ensure the promotion of black state troopers.6 1 The plan
followed years of court battles and ineffective consent decrees in re-
sponse to the Department's "systematic and perpetual" discrimination
against black state troopers.62 Appellants challenged the consent decree,
claiming the plan granted preferential treatment to Black state troopers,
thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.63
Since its mandate to promote some state troopers based on race was
a race-preference policy, the Court applied a strict scrutiny standard.6
4
The Court would uphold the decree only if it was "narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest."65
standing, the group only had to demonstrate that it had difficulty in obtaining the benefit.
Such a showing was enough to demonstrate a prima facie case of denial of equal
treatment. Id. at 2302.
58. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299, 98 S. Ct. at 2753. See also supra note 41.
59. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Adarand
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); and text accompanying notes 72-75.
60. 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
61. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1055.
62. Id. at 153, 107 S. Ct. at 1057. In 1972, the district court issued an order imposing
a hiring freeze and ordering the Department to refrain from engaging in discriminatory
employment practices, including promotions. Seven years after the initial decree, the
court found that the Department had still not implemented a plan to increase minority
candidate promotions. Thus, the court approved a second consent decree in which the
parties agreed that the Department would administer a promotions exam to all applicants.
Promotions would be granted based on performance on the exam. However, African
American candidates performed disproportionately more poorly on the exam, and when
the Department announced a need to promote fifteen new candidates, none of the African
American candidates had performed well enough to be eligible for promotion. Id. at 163,
107 S. Ct. at 1062. The United States objected to using the test for promotions and in
1983, the district court ruled that the test had an adverse impact on African Americans.
The district court subsequently ordered that, for a period of time, at least 50% of those
promoted must be African American. The United States appealed the court's order on
the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court of appeals affirmed
the order and the United States appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 149, 107 S. Ct. at
1053.
63. Id. at 150, 107 S. Ct. at 1055.
64. Id. at 167, 107 S. Ct. at 1064.
65. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1976). In
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Paradise clearly articulated the narrowly tailored element of the strict
scrutiny test. The Justices unanimously concluded that the appropriate
considerations for finding whether a race-based program was narrowly
tailored included: (1) the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of
alternative remedies; (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief; (3)
the relationship between the numerical goals and the relevant labor
market; and (4) the impact of the relief on the rights of third parties.6 6
The Justices agreed that the circumstances preceding the need for the
consent decree, and the lower court's decision to issue the decree,
sufficiently demonstrated a compelling governmental interest in reme-
dying past and present discrimination by a state actor. 7 Justice Brennan,
with whom Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Powell joined, concluded
that even under a strict scrutiny analysis, the one-black-to-one-white
promotion requirement was permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause.68 Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred. These
five Justices found that the one-black-to-one-white hiring program was
narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of remedying proven discrimina-
tion.69
Paradise gave courts clear guidelines for evaluating race-based pro-
grams. However, the Court's conclusion that since the program survived
strict scrutiny, there was no need to consider the appropriate level of
Equal Protection review, 70 left open the question of whether strict
scrutiny is always appropriate for race-based preference programs. When
read together with Bakke, it seemed that the strict scrutiny test was
Wygant, Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor, referred to his language in Bakke to enunciate the present strict
scrutiny test. The Court considered a collective bargaining agreement between the Board
of Education and a teachers' union that provided for layoffs by seniority where the
percentage of minorities laid off would exceed the percentage of minorities employed at
the time. The Board of Education justified this race-based policy on the need for diverse
role models for its students. Justice Powell wrote that where race-based programs are
concerned, the racial classification must be justified by "a compelling state purpose and
the means chosen by the state to effectuate that purpose must be narrowly tailored." Id.
at 285, 106 S. Ct. at 1852.
66. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S. Ct. at 1066.
67. The Court upheld the district court's order by a 5-4 margin and there was no
majority opinion. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Powell
in a plurality opinion. Powell concurred in the judgment, but concluded that the Court
should not institute judicial remedies for proven de jure discrimination. However, he
found that the Supreme Court's school desegregation cases established the principle that
lower courts have a reasonable degree of flexibility in fashioning remedies for proven
government discrimination. The Justices also agreed that the program could be upheld
if it was narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Id. at 185, 107 S. Ct. at 1073.
68. Id. at 186, 107 S. Ct. at 1074. Stevens agreed with the result. The Court found
that the race-conscious relief ordered by the district court was justified by a compelling
governmental interest in eradicating the Department's pervasive, systematic and obstinate
discriminatory exclusion of Blacks. Id. at 166-70, 107 S. Ct. at 1063-66.
69. Id. at 186, 106 S. Ct. at 1074.
70. Id. at 166-67, 106 S. Ct. at 1063-64.
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appropriate when reviewing benign discrimination race-preference pro-
grams of state and local government. The Court clarified this uncertainty
in 1989 in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, 7 1 which mandated
the use of the strict scrutiny test for state and local government race-
based affirmative action policies.72
In Croson, the Court reviewed a plan that required a primary city
contractor to award 30% of the amount of its contract to minority
business enterprises (MBEs), defined as subcontractor businesses owned
by members of certain minority groups. 73 Croson, a non-minority con-
tractor, challenged the program as violative of Equal Protection. 74 Justice
O'Connor wrote that a state or local affirmative action admission policy
is subject to strict scrutiny. 75 Justices Rehnquist, White, Kennedy and
Scalia agreed with that portion of the opinion.76 Croson makes clear
that the Court will uphold race-based preference policies under the
Fourteenth Amendment only where there is a compelling governmental
interest and where the program is narrowly tailored to meet the policy's
necessary objectives. 77
In June, 1995, the Supreme Court extended the rigorous strict scrutiny
standard of review to federal race-based preference programs in Adar-
and Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. 7s Adarand considered the constitution-
ality of a federal statute that granted financial incentives to prime
contractors who awarded subcontracts to companies controlled by so-
cially and economically disadvantaged individuals. 79 Adarand, a non-
71. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
72. Id. at 494-96, 109 S. Ct. at 722-23.
73. The statute identified "Black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Eskimos, or Aleuts"
as minorities. Id. at 478, 109 S. Ct. at 713 (citing RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 12-
156(a)(1985)).
74. Id. at 483, 109 S. Ct. at 716.
75. Justice O'Conner wrote the opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White
joined Justice O'Connor. Justices Kennedy and Scalia each concurred in separate opinions.
Justice Stevens concurred in the decision but found it unnecessary to consider the
appropriate standard of review. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent, which was joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. See id. at 537-38, 109 S. Ct. at 744-45.
76. Id. at 475, 109 S. Ct. at 712.
77. Id. at 517, 109 S. Ct. at 734.
78. 115 S. Ct. 209 (1995). A 1993 decision foreshadowed the Court's move toward
applying the rigorous standard in a sweeping way. In Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816
(1993), the Court considered whether a state-created voting district, clearly drawn to
ensure a Black majority, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Show considered the
appropriate standard under which to review state legislation that created voting districts
based on race. The Attorney General maintained that the Court should review the
legislation under intermediate scrutiny, which the Court applied to all other "vote-
dilution" cases. The majority disagreed and held that since the legislation clearly
distinguished among citizens based on race, it potentially burdened one group in the
interest of benefiting another, thereby threatening the "special harms" of race-based
preference policies. Thus, the legislation must be subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
79. Adorond, 115 S. Ct. at 2102. The Court considered policies promulgated under
the authority of Section 8 of The Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-656 (1994) (Act).
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minority owned contracting company, challenged the federal program
as violative of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that "no person
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." 0
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor first considered the appro-
priate level of review for assessing whether the federal program was
permissible.8' Prior to Adarand, Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C. 82 was the
precedent. Metro Broadcasting held that "benign" federal racial clas-
sifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny.8 3 Justice O'Connor
suggested that the need for intermediate scrutiny may have evolved
from the principle that the Fifth Amendment does not protect individual
rights to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment. 84 This was in
sharp contrast to the Court's requirement that the Equal Protection
Clause demands strict scrutiny of "benign" state or local race-based
preference policies. s5 A majority of the Adarand Court overruled Metro
Broadcasting88 and held that the more stringent standard should apply
The Act provides in part that it is the policy of the United States to provide "maximum
practicable opportunity" to small business concerns owned and controlled by socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals engaged in contracting with federal agencies.
Id. § 637(d)(1).
80. U.S. CONST. amend V. Adarand Constructors, Inc. is a Colorado-based highway
construction Company. In 1989, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division of the
United States Department of Transportation solicited bids for a Colorado highway con-
struction project. Mountain Gravel Construction Co. (Mountain Gravel), a general con-
tractor, solicited subcontract bids and then submitted to the government a bid for the
entire job. Adarand Constructors submitted to Mountain Gravel the lowest bid to perform
the guard rail construction work for the highway construction project. However, Mountain
Gravel awarded the guard rail job to Gonzales Construction Co., a certified small business
controlled by "socially or economically disadvantaged individuals." Because Mountain
Gravel awarded the bid to Gonzalez, it received payment by the federal government and
was therefore able to submit a lower overall bid for the construction project than it could
have had it accepted Adarand's bid. The Government awarded Mountain Gravel the
construction project. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2102.
81. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion and was joined in part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Scalia. Justices Scalia and Thomas
filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stevens filed
a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Souter filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Breyer joined. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2101.
82. 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
83. Id. at 564-65, 110 S. Ct. at 3008-09 (concluding that "benign" federal racial
classifications are permissible if "they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2781 (1980)(finding
a reviewing court must uphold federal race-based legislation if the objectives of the
legislation are within the power of Congress and the limited use of racial and ethnic
criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally permissible means for achieving
the constitutional objective).
84. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2106.
85. Id. at 2110.
86. See also Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, 100 S. Ct. 2758 (1980).
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to all race-based preference policies, regardless of who implements the
policy." The strict scrutiny test "ensure[s] that the personal right to
equal protection of the laws has not been infringed. '"88
Adarand cited the strict scrutiny test language as controlling. A
reviewing court must consider whether a "benign" racial classification
serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to
meet that interest."" The Court did not pass on the legislation but
instead remanded the case to be considered under the stricter standard.90
Thus, Adarand does not define "compelling interest" or "narrowly
tailored," nor does it provide further insight into when the Court would
find that legislation survives strict scrutiny.
Although Adarand imposed a stricter standard for all race-preference
policies, several Justices noted that there may be instances where a
policy will survive this rigorous test.91 The majority held that the
government is not disqualified from acting in response to the unhappy
persistence of both the practice and lingering effects of racial discrim-
ination.9 2 The majority further tried to dispel the notion that "strict
scrutiny is 'strict in theory but fatal in fact. ' ' 113 Thus, despite recent
claims that Adarand killed affirmative action, 94 the reality may be quite
the contrary.
95
The Adarand decision is jurisprudentially sound. It extends the same
standard of review to federal race-based policies that the Court previ-
ously applied to state and local policies. Federal, state, and local
87. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
88. Id. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, wrote that "nothing is inherently wrong
with applying a single standard to fundamentally different situations, as long as that
standard takes relevant differences into account." Id. at 2122 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor stated that what Justice Stevens failed to recognize was that the
specificity of the strict scrutiny test allows for various considerations, including which
governmental entity is implementing the race-based preference policy. Id. at 2113. "The
point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the government in support of a
racial classification, and the evidence offered to show that the classification is needed,
is precisely to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of race in governmental
decision making .... [T~he point of strict scrutiny is to differentiate between permissible
and impermissible governmental uses of race." Id. The court remanded the challenge
for further consideration under this new test, and thus although Adarand reaffirms the
test, it does not give guidance into specific elements that will meet the test. Id. at 2118.
89. Id. at 2113.
90. Id. at 2118.
91. Id. at 2117.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2117 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519, 100 S. Ct. at 2795 (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
94. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Affirmative Action; Justices, 5 to 4,
Cast Doubts on U.S. Programs that Give Preference Based on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1995, at Al; Charles Krauthammer, Never Mind the Court Decision: Affirmative Action
Will Die in Legislatures, PrIrSBURGH POST-GAZETE, June 19, 1995, at A8; Another Blow
to Affirmative Action, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 14, 1995, at 6B.
95. See Penda Hair, Adarand Case Doesn't Kill Affirmative Action, THE DENVER POST,
June 19, 1995 at B7.
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entities96 enact race-preference policies in response to the same problem:
discrimination in America. Additionally, these policies all have the
same goal to diversify where diversity has not occurred absent some
sort of regulation. Given the parallel in the ends and the means of
these policies, it is justifiable that courts review these policies under
the same rigorous guidelines.
Furthermore, while the language of the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments is different, the guarantees are essentially the same. Fed-
eral, state, and local governments, and any entities thereof, cannot
impinge on individual liberties for the sake of some notion of past
discrimination. Based on these guarantees, courts now require entities
to demonstrate: (1) that there is a compelling need for a particular
policy and (2) that the program is narrowly tailored to achieve its end
action to rectify current disparity. Proponents of a particular "benign"
race-based policy will do well to have their policy reviewed under
strict scrutiny. If a policy survives such exacting review, it is clearly
necessary and effective. The stringent review might, therefore, console
even the most ardent affirmative action opponent.
Unfortunately, while the Court has confirmed the proper standard of
review for "benign" race-based preference policies, it has given little
guidance in dealing with a particular program which meets the strict
scrutiny standard. The Court has evaluated race-preference policies
under the strict scrutiny test, thereby shedding some insight into when
it deems a policy permissible. However, the Court has not suggested
appropriate viable alternatives to impermissible race-based preference
policies. In fact, it seems to have taken the approach that Justice Stewart
took toward pornography in Jacobellis v. Ohio,9 7 it will know a per-
missible race-preference policy when it sees one; for the most part,
however, the challenged race-preference policies "are not that."9 8 This
attitude has left law school admission committees and other institutions
interested in enacting race-based preference policies in a quandry.
96. An entity is any body receiving funding from a governmental unit. Thus, private
law schools are governmental entities if such schools' operational budgets are derived,
in part, from government funds. See Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597
(1974). In Bob Jones, the district court in South Carolina considered whether veterans
benefits could be terminated with regard to students receiving the federal assistance to
attend Bob Jones University. At issue was whether the federal funding could be terminated
since the tuition dollars were spent at an institution that did not comply with Title VI.
Bob Jones claimed that the federal government could not force compliance with Title VI
since it did not directly receive federal funding. The court ruled that the university,
which included 221 students who during the year received benefits of approximately
$397,800 under federal assistance programs for veterans, was a recipient of federal
assistance within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and thus was governed by
the law. Id. at 601.
97. 378 U.S. 184, 84 S. Ct. 1676 (1964).
98. With regard to whether a motion picture was pornographic, Justice Stewart wrote,
"I know it when I see it and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Id.
at 197, 84 S. Ct. at 1683.
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Nevertheless, recent Court decisions lend guidance to determine when
a reviewing court might find a compelling governmental interest and
when a policy is narrowly tailored to that interest.
1. Compelling Governmental Interest
As a general rule, the Court has been unwilling to uphold race-based
remedial programs unless the governmental entity can demonstrate
present effects of past discrimination. 99 The Court has carved out an
exception where education is concerned. In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote
that the educational interest in diversity is substantial and may support
a state's compelling governmental interest in enacting a race-based
policy.100 The Court has not required evidence of discrimination in
upholding educational race-based policies since educational diversity
equally benefits all students, regardless of membership in a particular
group. 101
Justice Powell wrote that the benefits of diversity in education flow
two ways: minority students are brought into the classroom and non-
minority students benefit from hearing the voices of others. 10 2 He wrote
that diversity is an essential element of education in undergraduate
school and in graduate school.103 Quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 0 4 Justice
Powell concluded that legal learning is ineffective "in isolation from
the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.' '105
99. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280, 160 S. Ct. 1842, 1850
(1986); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 489, 109 S. Ct. 706, 719 (1989).
100. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2763
(1978).
101. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct.
2733 (1978); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 570 (W.D. Tex. 1994). Under current
law, the goal of diversity is sufficient by itself to satisfy a compelling governmental
interest. See also Shurberg Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
102. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 2760. Justice Powell wrote that "[a]n
otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background ... may bring to a
professional school .. .outlooks[ I and ideas that enrich the training of its student body
• ..and better equip[s] . . . graduates to render with understanding their vital service to
humanity." Id. at 314, 98 S. Ct. at 2760. An environment fostering robust exchange of
ideas makes the goal of diversity of "paramount importance to the fulfillment of [a
university's] mission." Id. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 2760.
103. Id. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at 2760.
104. 339 U.S. 629, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950).
105. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314, 98 S. Ct. at 2760 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634, 70
S. Ct. at 850)). Since Bakke, various Justices have echoed Justice Powell's opinion. In
Metro Broadcasting, the Court considered the validity of F.C.C. policies granting pref-
erential treatment based on race. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, wrote that "a
'diverse student body' contributing to a 'robust exchange of ideas' is a 'constitutionally
permissible goal."' Id. at 567, 110 S. Ct. at 3010. In Wygant, where the Court reversed
a decision upholding a bargaining agreement that limited the number of minority teachers
the Board of Education would layoff in order to preserve the ratio of minority to non-
minority faculty, four Justices recognized the compelling governmental interest in diver-
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When considering whether there is a compelling governmental inter-
est in enacting a race-based preference policy, the Court evaluates the
intrusion of a particular policy on innocent individuals. When "erad-
icating racial discrimination," the Court may uphold policies whereby
"innocent persons may be called upon to bear some of the burden."'0 °
However, any imposition must be strongly limited. 07 Thus in Wygant,
a majority of the Court held that a preferential lay-off policy imposed
too great a burden on others since it translated into the loss of existing
jobs for some "innocent third parties."' 0 8 Four Justices suggested that
race-based hiring goals might be more acceptable than a lay-off program
since such a policy only resulted in denial of a future employment
opportunity and therefore was not as intrusive as the loss of an existing
job.1°9
In contrast, where education is concerned, the Court has written of
the value that non-minorities receive from diversity. Diversity enriches
the training of a student body and better equips graduates to "render
with understanding their vital service to humanity.""10 Unlike in the
employment sector, where an "innocent third party" may lose a job or
livelihood as a consequence of a race-based preference policy, the
training through diverse voices stands to benefit the "innocent third
parties" in the classroom. Thus, the Court's finding of a compelling
governmental interest in diversifying education, as opposed to requiring
proof of past discrimination for race-based preference policies in the
employment sector, is logical given the distinction between education
and employment.
2. "Narrowly Tailored to Meet the Policy's Objectives"
The Court's application of the Paradise "narrowly tailored" test
illustrates its general reluctance to validate race-based remedial policies
absent strong proof that such policies are necessary and are the only
means available to achieve a federally-funded entity's compelling in-
terest. The four-part test requires proof that there is a need for relief,
that the policy is temporary, that there is a rational relationship between
the goals of the policy and the population the policy seeks to assist,
and that the policy does not unfairly favor one particular group."'
sifying education. Justice O'Connor in her concurrence wrote that the "state interest in
the promotion of racial diversity [in education] has been found sufficiently compelling."
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1853 (1989). Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun in their dissent agreed with Justice O'Connor that the
state has a compelling governmental interest in diversifying education. Id.
106. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281, 106 S. Ct. at 1850.
107. Id.
108..Id. at 281, 284, 106 S. Ct. at 1850, 1852. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor and White reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit.
109. Id. at 281, 106 S. Ct. at 1850-57.
110. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2760
(1978).
111. See generally United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
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Recent decisions illustrate the Court's boundaries for the four elements.
a. The Necessity of the Relief and the Efficacy of Alternative
Remedies
The Court will not uphold a benign race-based remedial policy unless
the governmental entity enacting the policy demonstrates that the policy
is necessary to achieve a compelling interest. Furthermore, the policy
must be the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve the
goals of the federally-funded entity's program. 112 In determining whether
a program satisfies this element, the Court will consider the purpose
the program is designed to serve, the policy reasons for the program
and the availability of alternative relief. 1 3
The Court has held that relief is necessary where a federally funded
entity predicates professional advancement on tests that yield a variable
achievement rate for different races or ethnicities. 1"4 For example,
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York"'
considered the necessity for an alternative to an examination-based
police hiring program. Petitioners, Black and Hispanic police officers,
were appointed to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) upon
passing the examinations administered for entry level appointments.
As a group, the test scores of Black and Hispanic police officers were
well below the test scores of non-minority candidates. Since appoint-
ments were made based on test scores, the examinations caused Blacks
and Hispanics to be hired later than most non-minority candidates." 6
NYPD also fired police officers on a last-hired first-fired basis. Thus,
more often than not, Blacks and Hispanics were fired first.1 7 The Court
concluded that the performance on the examination yielded a dispro-
portionate representation of Blacks and Hispanics on the police force.
Consequently, there was a need for relief from the discriminatory effect
of the standardized examination." 8
112. See supra text accompanying note 89.
113. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 170-74, 107 S. Ct. at 1066-68.
114. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm. of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 582, 103 S. Ct. at 3222. The disparity in exam scores also lessened
petitioners' seniority and other benefits, which were similarly based on exam performance.
117. Id. at 565-86, 103 S. Ct. at 3223-24. The district court found that the challenged
examination had a discriminatory impact on the scores and pass rates of Blacks and
Hispanics and were not job-related. These findings were upheld by the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court seemed to agree. Id. at 585, 103 S. Ct. at 3223.
118. The Court, however, was divided as to whether the remedial measure of hiring
one black for one white was appropriate under the law. Id. Bakke did not consider the
Davis program in such specific terms. However, both Justice Powell and justice Brennan
recognized that the purpose behind the Davis program was to ensure the State's legitimate
interest in promoting diversity in education. Justice Powell found the Congressional
testimony in support of the Civil Rights Act supported race-based preference programs
or polices. Absent some policies, he concluded, certain groups might not receive such
equality. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 340, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2773
(1987).
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In addition to finding the need for relief where objective tests yield
a disparate result, the Court has held that there is a need to eliminate
racial segregation in education generally. 19 Thus, where a reviewing
court finds that test scores, or policies on which test scores are based,
have a discriminatory effect, it will likely find a need for relief. Such
relief, however, must be the least intrusive and most efficient alternative
to achieve elimination of the discriminatory impact.
To date, the Court has not offered litigants more efficient alternatives
to challenged polices. The Court has suggested that less intrusive "stop
gap" measures are not more efficient since such measures will not
yield an ultimate resolution to a problem.' 20 In general, the Court has
upheld policies as efficient where the entity offering the policy will
achieve its goals.121
b. "Flexible, Waivable and Temporary in Nature"
The Court has made clear that an affirmative action policy will not
withstand the second element of the narrowly tailored test unless it is
easily adaptable to changing governmental needs (flexible); easily ter-
minated when not needed (waivable); and limited in duration (tempo-
rary).1 22 In Croson, the Court struck down the Minority Business
Enterprise legislation since it did not have either a specific termination
date or, at a minimum, a provision for reviewing the legislation.123 The
Paradise Court found the one-black-to-one-white hiring plan met the
second element of the narrowly tailored test since the district court
mandated the hiring program only for as long as the department
continued to prohibit minorities from being promoted. 124 Additionally,
under the consent decree, the court could easily eliminate the program
once Alabama's Department of Public Safety promoted a reasonable
number of Black and Hispanic troopers by no longer mandating the
state's method of promotion. 2 ' Thus, a program or policy will pass the
second element of the narrowly tailored test if the reviewing court can
identify a termination provision with a quick method of eliminating
the policy once the federally funded entity meets the goals of the policy
or program.
The Court will conclude that a need for relief exists when an "ob-
jective" test yields a discriminatory result. 126 The Court has also found
119. See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 (1992).
120. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-74, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1066-68
(1987).
121. See Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm. of N.Y., 463 U.S. 582, 103 S. Ct.
3221 (1983).
122. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178, 107 S. Ct. at 1070.
123. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
124. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178, 107 S. Ct. at 1070.
125. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 163-64, 107 S. Ct. at 1062-63. The Court found that the
one-black-to-one-white hiring program was not necessary after one year since the De-
partment achieved a comfortable level of diversity. Id. at 165-66, 107 S. Ct. at 1063.
126. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S. Ct. at 1066.
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a need for relief from educational policies that result in discrimination
or separation by race.127 Thus, it is likely that where the Court finds
that "objective" tests infringe on the rights of individuals to advance
based on race, the Court will find that relief is necessary and must be
achieved in the least intrusive manner.
c. "Relationship of Numerical Goals to Relevant Population"
In analyzing the third element of the narrowly tailored test, the
reviewing court must consider the numerical relationship between an
entity's goals for its race-based program and the desired end of the
program. Statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose supplies
the court with a means for determining that the entity offering the
remedial policy had a "firm basis for concluding that remedial action
was appropriate. "128 The Croson Court found that Richmond's statistical
analysis was not narrowly tailored to its goal of increasing minority
participation in contracting. 2' The legislation required primary con-
tractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty
percent of the dollar amount of each contract to Minority Business
Enterprises.130 The Richmond legislature chose the numerical goal of
30% based on the percentage of minorities in the general population.131
The Court found that since the City's goal of 30% minority sub-
contractors reflected the general population and not the relevant pop-
ulation of minority contractors in the area, it did not meet the third
element of the narrowly tailored test. 32 The Court made clear that
setting a goal based on the general population is impermissible, since
it "rests upon the completely unrealistic assumption that minorities
will choose a particular trade in lock step proportion to their represen-
tation in the local population. '133
The Court will hold that the program's numerical goals bear a
reasonable relationship to the relevant population when the policy's
goals are measured against a population more closely tied to the
particular group of individuals the policy seeks to benefit. 34 Paradise
127. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2743 (1992).
128. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1856 (1985).




133. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507, 109 S. Ct. at 729. See also Sheet Metal Workers v.
E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). In Sheet Metal Workers, the district court
set a union goal of non-whites in the applicable pool against the number of minorities
in the New York City population. The court held that the plan was not narrowly tailored
and that the statistics bore no rational bearing to the goal of increasing the percentage
of minorities in the union. Id. at 444, 106 S. Ct. at 3033. Justice O'Conner, affirming in
part and dissenting in part wrote, "[I]t is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals
of each race will gravitate with mathematical exactitude to each employer or union absent
unlawful discrimination." Id. at 494, 106 S. Ct. at 3059.
134. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469, 109 S. Ct. at 706.
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held that the one-black to one-white hiring scheme was valid because
the goal of the program was measured against the non-white population
in the relevant work force.135 Similarly, in Sheet Metal Workers v.
E.E.O.C., the Court rejected an argument that a Union's non-white
membership goal should reflect something other than the percentage of
non-whites in New York City. 136 The Court held that the appropriate
statistical relationship could reflect the percentage of non-whites in the
New York City Union because the program was aimed at ameliorating
discriminatory effects within a Union whose membership was employed
in New York City.1 37
The "statistical relationship" analysis is contradictory to past deci-
sions. In Bakke, a majority held that goals and quotas are never
permissible in enacting race-based preference programs or policies. 38
Despite this, Paradise held that a reviewing court should consider the
numerical goals of a particular race-based preference program.139 Recent
decisions acknowledge that a reviewing court cannot identify the ap-
propriate time to end a program absent some numerical measure. 4 ' The
Court has recognized that the best way to assess the "speed of progress"
toward fair diversity is through statistical evidence.' 4 1 Yet, the Bakke
prohibition against "goals" or "quotas" remains intact. The Court's
acknowledgment, through the third element of the narrowly tailored
test, that there must be some recognizable numerical goal of achieve-
ment after which a program or policy is no longer necessary, seems a
tacit way of overruling the Bakke principle.
d. "The Policy May Not Favor One Group Over Another"
The fourth element of the narrowly tailored test most closely embodies
the principles of the Equal Protection Clause. Congress adopted the Equal
Protection Clause to ensure that minorities, particularly African Ameri-
cans, were not denied equal treatment under the law. 142 However, as
programs and polices aimed at benefiting African Americans and other
135. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
136. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 440-42, 106 S. Ct. at 3031-32.
137. Id. at 482, 106 S. Ct. at 3053.
138. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 285, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2747
(1978).
139. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S. Ct. at 1066.
140. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-181, 107 S. Ct. at 1070-73. See generally Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 978 U.S.
421, 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). See also Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (affirming
the Paradise narrowly-tailored test).
141. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-81, 107 S. Ct. at 1070-73; Sheet Metal Workers,
478 U.S. at 477-78, 106 S. Ct. at 3057.
142. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 286, 98 S. Ct at 2746. The Equal Protection Clause became
a vehicle to ensure that African Americans received "the same rights and opportunities
that white people take for granted." Id. at 287, 98 S. Ct. at 2746.
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minorities became more popular, particularly following Congressional
enactment of the Civil Rights Act, the Court began to use the Equal
Protection Clause to safeguard the treatment white males previously took
for granted. Bakke struck down the Davis admission policy because it
impermissibly granted admission to minority applicants who would not
otherwise have the opportunity to enter medical school over white males
with higher test scores.143 Davis' separate admissions committees, which
were created to increase the number of minority physicians in the
country, led to the medical school's unequal treatment of applicants.
1
"
In contrast, Paradise held that the one-black-to-one-white hiring require-
ment did not pose an unacceptable burden on white males because the
program did not absolutely bar any non-minority individual's advance-
ment; it merely postponed the white males' advancement.1 4, The Court
noted that, under the program, fifty percent of those promoted were non-
minority, there were no layoffs,1 46 and the basic requirement that black
troopers must be qualified still remained.147 The Court concluded that
these provisions safeguarded the program against providing unequal
treatment for individuals. 1
48
C. The Federal Courts' Application of the Strict Scrutiny Test
Although Adarand specifically tried to dispel the notion that "strict
in theory does not mean fatal in fact, "149 the national trend against race-
based preference policies may result in the Equal Protection Clause
becoming a barrier to diversification. Recently, two federal courts struck
down state racially-based post-secondary education policies tied to the
admissions process. Each holding echoes the conservative trend toward
which many judicial institutions are beginning to lean.
In Podberesky v. Kirwan"- and Hopwood v. Texas,151 federal courts
considered whether race-based preference programs that are part of
education admission policies violated the Equal Protection Clause. In
each instance, the court subjected the challenged policy to strict scrutiny.
Each court would uphold the challenged program if it served a compel-
ling governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to meet the school's
goals.
143. Id. at 320, 98 S. Ct. at 2763.
144. See generally id. at 265, 98 S. Ct. at 2733.
145. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182-83, 107 S. Ct. at 1072.
146. Id. at 182, 107 S. Ct. at 1072.
147. Id. at 183, 107 S. Ct. at 1073. The Court also noted that the policy merely
postponed promotion and that denial of future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as the loss of an existing job. Id., 107 S. Ct. at 1072.
148. Id. at 185, 107 S. Ct. at 1073.
149. Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2047, 2101 (1995). See also Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 519, 100 S. Ct. 2758, 2795 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
150. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
151. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
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In Podberesky v. Kirwan,152 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered whether a race-based scholarship program,
which was connected to the University of Maryland College Park (UMCP)
admissions program, violated the Equal Protection Clause. Daniel Pod-
beresky, an Hispanic male, applied to the University of Maryland in the
Fall of 1989. Along with his application, he requested that the school
consider him for the Banneker Scholarship, which was limited to students
of African American heritage.153 UMCP adopted the Banneker Scholarship
in response to an Office for Civil Rights (OCR) finding that segregation
between black and white students remained in the Maryland college and
university school system.15 4 Podberesky's scholastic achievement far ex-
ceeded the minimum requirements for the scholarship.
5 5
• Podberesky challenged the constitutional validity of the Banneker
program under the Equal Protection Clause. 156 The trial court found that
the race-based preference program triggered strict scrutiny review.
5 7 It
would permit the program to remain in effect if it was narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling interest. The court defined the compelling
governmental interest in accordance with Wygant and Croson, decisions
concerning employment race-preference policies. Accordingly, UMCP
would have to prove present effects of past discrimination in order to
justify the selectivity of the Banneker Scholarship.158 Upon review, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of UMCP.15 9 Podberesky
appealed.
The Fourth Circuit held that the trial court had correctly found that
the Banneker program should be examined in light of the Equal Protection
Clause.- 8 Under the strict scrutiny test as applied by the district court,
the Podberesky I court held that the lower court should not have granted
summary judgment, since that remedy did not permit the court to find
that there were still present effects of past discrimination.' 6 1 Moreover,
152. 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992).
153. The Banneker Scholarship was part of UMCP's "Black Undergraduate Recruitment
Program" it submitted to OCR in 1985. In 1987, UMCP submitted to OCR a revised
"Black Undergraduate Recruitment Plan" which listed the Banneker Scholarship as an
example of the expanded merit-based financial aid available to minority students. Id. at
54-55.
154. Id. at 54.
155. Appellant, Daniel Podberesky, had an academic record that far exceeded the
minimum requirements for the scholarship; 1340 out of 1600 on the Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) and a 4.0 high school grade point average (GPA). At the time appellant
applied for this scholarship, the minimum requirement for further consideration was a
900 on the SAT and a 3.0 high school GPA. Id. at 53-54.
156. Id. at 53.
157. Id. at 55.
158. Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106 S. Ct. 1842,
1847 (1986); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94, 109 S. Ct. 706, 720-21
(1989)).
159. Podbersky 1, 956 F.2d at 53.
160. Id. at 55.
161. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 22, No. 4
HeinOnline  -- 22 J.C. & U.L. 920 1995-1996
AFFIERMATIVE ACTION ADMISSIONS POLICIES
OCR's finding of past discrimination was an insufficient governmental
interest to justify a race-based scholarship program. 16 2 The court reversed
and remanded for new proceedings. 1 3
On remand, the district court found that UMCP had sufficient evidence
of present effects of past discrimination to justify the program and that
the program was narrowly tailored to serve its stated objectives.'6 Pod-
beresky again appealed to the Fourth Circuit.165 The Fourth Circuit again
subjected the Banneker Program to strict scrutiny."
The court found there was no compelling governmental interest to
justify the program since there were no present effects of past discrimi-
nation. 6 17 It rejected UMCP's argument that a poor reputation in the
African American community and a climate on campus that was per-
ceived to be racially hostile were sufficient to justify the race-based
scholarship. The court held that "mere knowledge of historical acts is
not the kind of present effect that can justify a race-exclusive remedy. If
it were otherwise, as long as people have access to history books, there
will be programs such as this one.' 16 Although the court recognized
that racial tensions still exist in American society, it deemed these
tensions and attitudes insufficient grounds for employing a race-conscious
remedy. 69 Moreover, the OCR findings were simply evidence of past
discrimination and did not establish any present effects of such discrim-
ination. 7 0 Ultimately, the court concluded that there was evidence that
the Banneker Scholarship program violated the Equal Protection Clause.
1
Thus, the court found that the district court erred in granting UMCP's
motion for summary judgment. 7 2
The Podberesky decisions are flawed. The district court defined a
compelling governmental interest based on employment challenges to
the Equal Protection ClauseY.3 Upon review, the Fourth Circuit failed to
recognize the clear exception the Supreme Court has carved out when
defining a compelling interest in diversifying education. 7 4 The Court
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Podberesky II, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (1994).
165. Id. at 152.
166. Id. at 153.
167. Id. at 154-55.
168. Id. at 154.
169. Id. at.155.
170. Podberesky 1, 966 F.2d at 55-57.
171. Podberesky II, 38 F.3d at 161.
172. Id.
173. The court held UMCP to the "strong basis in evidence" standard that satisfied
the Croson case. Podberesky 1, 956 F.2d at 55.
174. The Court has never overruled its distinction between a compelling governmental
interest in the employment sector and a compelling governmental interest in education.
Although Adarand most recently affirmed the language of the strict scrutiny test, it did
not define a "compelling governmental interest," thereby leaving in place Justice Powell's
distinction in Bakke for a compelling governmental interest in education. See supra text
accompanying notes 46-82 & 91-101.
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has recognized that there is a value to all in the classroom, regardless
of race or ethnic heritage, to hear the opinions of those from different
cultures. 175 Had any Podberesky court properly found a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in educational diversity, it might have upheld the
Banneker Scholarship as a valid means for increasing the number of
African Americans on campus.
In August, 1994, a United States district court, in Hopwood v. Texas, 176
considered whether the University of Texas School of Law's (UT) 1992
diversity admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI. In 1992, UT used a dual admission
policy. The chair of the admission's committee assigned one sub-com-
mittee to consider non-minority applicants and another sub-committee
to consider minority applicants.' Consequently, when reviewing a par-
ticular file, a member of the minority sub-committee could not consider
a particular application against a diverse reference group since he or she
did not consider non-minority applications. 18
Among those denied admission in 1992 were one white female and
three white males. 179 These four applicants challenged UT's decision,
175. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 98 S. Ct. 2733,
2759-60 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 306, 106 S. Ct. 1842,
1864 (1986); see also supra notes 42-43.
176. 861 F. Supp. 557 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
177. UT had two separate reviewing sub-committees. The Chair of the Admissions
Committee set a different presumptive admit or denial TI number for minorities, who
were reviewed by one sub-committee and for non-minorities, who were reviewed by a
separate sub committee. The Admissions Committee based acceptance to UT Law School
for all applicants on an index number that is a function of each applicant's combined
UGPA and LSAT. The Chair of the Admissions Committee initially reviewed all appli-
cations regardless of the applicant's residency, race or ethnic heritage and then set a
number below which students were presumptively denied admission and another number
above which students were automatically admitted to the school. The sub-committees
reviewed applicants with numbers between the automatic admission and the automatic
rejection numbers.
The reviewing process also differed for minority and for non-minority applicants in
other ways. The admissions office divided non-minority files into groups of thirty. Three
members of the non-minority sub-committee reviewed each non-minority applicant. In
contrast, the entire minority sub-committee reviewed each minority applicant. One
member of the minority subcommittee did not review non-minority applications. Id. at
562.
178. Id.
179. The denied applicants were all white, Texas residents. Cheryl J. Hopwood, a
white female, had a TI of 199, Kenneth Elliot's TI was 197, Douglas Carvell's TI was
197 and David Rogers' TI was 197. Id. at 564-67.
UT argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could have been put on the
waiting list. Moreover, UT maintained that these applicants could not demonstrate that
they would have been granted admission absent the challenged admissions policy. Id. at
567. The Court stated that it would not grant standing unless the plaintiffs could show
an injury in fact. The injury in fact for an equal protection case involving a barrier that
makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain benefits than it is for members
of another group, is the denial of the equal treatment. A denial of the benefit is not
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relying on Title VI and the Fourteenth Amendment.' The district court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the admission policy unconstitutionally
granted preferential treatment based on race.' 8'
Applying strict scrutiny analysis, the court, quoting Justice Powell in
Bakke, found that a compelling governmental interest existed since the
school's efforts were limited to "seeking the educational benefits that
flow from having a diverse student body and to addressing the present
effects of past discriminatory practices.' '12 The court concluded that
without the diversity admission policy, UT would not have achieved a
diverse student body.'18 The recent OCR findings coupled with the State's
"long history of discriminating against [BIlacks and Mexicans," and
UT's history of racial discrimination provided sufficient evidence to
establish that the remedial purpose of UT's diversity admission policy
constituted a compelling governmental interest. 84
Although the court concluded that UT had a compelling interest in
using a diversity admission policy, the policy failed to pass constitutional
muster because it was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals of diversity
and reversing discrimination. Applying the Paradise test when consid-
ering whether the program was narrowly tailored, the court found that
necessary for standing. Thus, because the plaintiffs were not considered for admission
in a manner similar to minority students, the court ruled the applicants had standing to
bring their claim. Id. at 568. See also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301-02 (1993).
180. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 569.
181. The court noted that the diversity admission policy was not entirely voluntary
because UT adopted the policy in response to the OCR Texas plan. Nonetheless, the
court concluded that under an equal protection analysis, the same level of scrutiny
applied to race conscious affirmative action plans adopted pursuant to a consent agree-
ment whether or not such plans were voluntarily adopted. Thus, the court would uphold
the policy if it met the Supreme Court's requirements that (1) there was a compelling
governmental interest, and (2) the policy was narrowly tailored to achieve the goals of
that interest. Id. at 569 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274, 106
S. Ct. 1842, 1847 (1986)). See also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.
Ct. 706 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291, 98 S. Ct. 2733,
2748 (1978). The purpose of ascertaining whether a compelling governmental interest
exists is to smoke out the illegitimate uses of race by ensuring that the goal is in fact
important. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 569 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S. Ct.
at 721)). The narrowly tailored analysis ensures that the means chosen fit the compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification
was illegitimate racial prejudice.
182. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313, 98 S. Ct. at
2760) (environment fostering robust exchange of ideas makes goal of diversity of para-
mount importance in the fulfillment of a university's mission); Podbersky 1, 956 F.2d.
52, 57 (1992) (race-related remedy may be used in an attempt to remedy effect of past
discrimination)).
183. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 573. If the UT Law School had considered minorities
under the general admissions policy, without regard to race or ethnicity, the admissions
committee would have offered seats to 936 students, nine of whom were identified as
African American and eighteen of whom were identified as Mexican American. Id. at
571.
184. Id. at 571.
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the diversity admission policy met the first three factors. First, UT
sufficiently demonstrated that it was impossible to achieve diversity
without an affirmative action admission policy.185 Second, the objective
of UT Law School was to narrow the gap progressively so that at some
point in time UT would no longer need a diversity admission policy. 186
Third, UT Law School's goals for minority enrollment as a percent of
total enrollment bore a reasonable relationship to the percent of minority
college graduates in Texas. These goals were also consistent with the
OCR plan. 187
Ultimately, the court held that the diversity admission policy violated
the Fourteenth Amendment because it failed to afford each individual
applicant a comparison with the entire pool of applicants.1 88 The court
recognized the laudable and imperative goal of diversity in the education
system. Moreover, it agreed with Justice Powell that race or ethnicity
could be considered a plus factor in a school's consideration of a
particular applicant."' The court noted that when weighing non-tradi-
tional factors in the admissions decision, it is permissible for an admis-
sions committee to choose an applicant with a lower LSAT and/or UGPA.
Such an applicant may be preferable based on qualifications that include
non-objective factors.19°
UT's dual admission policy "insulated applicants" from review against
each other, a process which the Bakke Court also found impermissible.I"
However, while Hopwood rules out a dual admission policy, it recognizes
the value the Supreme Court placed on diversity. Under Hopwood,
admission committee members may consider race as a factor that is
weighed against the unique characteristics that non-minority applicants
possess. A school that does not permit a comparison between minority
and non-minority applicants, however, unfairly favors one group over
another. 192
185. Id. at 573. The court also noted that the ultimate effect of abandoning the diversity
admission policy would be to redirect minority students to the historically separate state
law school at Texas Southern University, thereby segregating the law school again. Id.
186. Id. at 575. The court noted that the admissions committee regularly meets to
review and to readjust the diversity admission policy to meet the current needs of the
school of law with regard to diversity. Id.
187. Id. The relevant population referred to in factor three is not considered to be the
general population of the United States.
188. Id. at 579.
189. Id. at 578 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18, 98 S. Ct. at 2762)). The court also
recognized other schools with seemingly similar affirmative action admission policies.
190. Id. at 577. "It is permissible and sometimes necessary to permit an applicant to
lose out on the last available seat to another applicant receiving a 'plus' on the basis of
ethnic background. Under such a policy, that applicant is not foreclosed from all
consideration".
191. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317, 98 S. Ct. at 2762.
192. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578. Weeks before the trial began, the University of
Texas School of Law modified its admission plan. As of September 1, 1994, the admissions
committee consisted of one full time faculty member, the assistant dean for admissions.
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With the exception of separately reviewing minority candidates, the
admissions committees treated applicants similarly. In fact, the court
suggested that it would have upheld the admissions policy absent the
separate reviewing committees. 193 Thus what Hopwood really stands for
is the pronouncement the Court made over 40 years ago in Brown v.
Board of Education:19 "separate but equal is inherently unequal."195
As plaintiffs continue to challenge diversity admission programs. re-
viewing courts will most likely apply the strict scrutiny test conserva-
tively. It is unclear whether the Court will redefine a compelling
governmental interest in education to require present effects of past
discrimination. Such a standard is much more difficult to meet than
merely proving the need for diversity. However, the value of diversity
in the classroom benefits all groups equally and thus a strong basis exists
for letting Justice Powell's findings in Bakke stand. Under the current
law, it is still possible to construct a diversity admission policy that will
withstand strict scrutiny.
Ill. A MODEL DIVERsrrY ADMISSION POLICY
The diversity admission policy (model policy) empowers an admissions
committee with full responsibility for selecting students for admission
to the law school .s Applicants to the law school should include in their
application the raw LSAT and UGPA; an application form; a numerical
index calculated from the student's UGPA and LSAT; and a candidate
profile, which includes an opportunity for applicants to identify their
race or ethnicity and any other information an applicant deems pertinent,
including references, a personal statement or a resume. The numerical
index is the basis upon which further review takes place.1 97 During its
Race and ethnicity will continue to be factors, but the Law School has removed its
presumptively deny and discretionary categories, and will review all candidates that are
not automatically admitted based on their TI number. See Janet Elliot, UT Responds to
Suit with Policy Changes, TEXAS LAw, May 23, 1994, at 10.
193. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 578-79.
194. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
195. Id. at 495, 74 S. Ct. at 692.
196. Courts that have considered diversity admissions programs have not identified
the appropriate number of members of an admission committee or the appropriate
members of the committee vis-a-vis employment status. Thus, the number of members
should probably be a function of the amount of work the application process generates.
Moreover, committee members could be faculty, students, administrators or any combi-
nation thereof.
The Pace University School of Law Admissions Committee is comprised of seven
faculty members, including the Dean of Students and five students. Two faculty members
and one student read each application. In 1994, the School received 2,752 applications,
the majority of which were in the discretionary category.
197. The LSAC calculates the index based upon information a school gives to them
in a "correlation report." The correlation report is based upon the incoming class's
UGPA and LSAT averages. The LSAC then looks at the school's correlation reports for
the past three years and, given what it sees regarding how much weight has been given
1996]
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initial meeting each year, the admissions committee should decide what
index to use for purposes of automatic admission and automatic rejection.
In addition, the committee may set a minimum LSAT score. 198
Applicants with indices above the automatic acceptance line receive
letters of acceptance without committee review and applicants below the
automatic rejection line are rejected. Applicants whose indices place
them below the automatic admission line and above the automatic
rejection line are in the discretionary group. All Committee members
review each applicant in the discretionary group. Committee members
review applications in groups of about thirty applications, which provides
a broad basis against which applicants can be compared. Minority ap-
plicants are interspersed among each group but do not comprise any one
group of applications.
In assessing a particular candidate's qualifications, each committee
member should be sensitive to the value diversity has in the classroom
and should consider, among other things, the undergraduate institution
from which the applicant came, any graduate degrees, work experience,
ability to speak a foreign language, personal statement, letters of rec-
ommendation, race, ethnic heritage, national origin, age, past experience
and the essay portion of the LSAT. A committee member may assign a
particular value to each attribute, including race and ethnicity, as he or
she deems appropriate.
For any academic year, the admissions committee should strive to
achieve an entering class whose ethnic and racial diversity is proportional
to the number of minority students graduating from college that year.199
The admissions committee should periodically assess the minority ap-
plicant acceptance rate throughout the yearly admission period. Com-
mittee members should place greater value on race or ethnicity if the
committee finds it is not admitting a fair number of minority candidates.
Similarly, the committee may limit the value of diversity when it deems
appropriate.
IV. SUBJECTING THE MODEL POLICY TO STRICT SCRUTINY
A. Law Schools Have a Compelling Interest in Employing a
Diversity Admissions Policy
The Court has recognized that the goal of a diverse student body will
support a finding of a compelling governmental interest, at least in
to the LSAT versus the GPA, provides a suggested index. For example. Pace University
School of Law currently weighs the UGPA 60% and the LSAT 40%. See supra notes 47-
48 and accompanying text.
198. At Pace University School of Law, any applicant for the Fall 1994 entering class
who scored 142 or below was rejected regardless of other factors such as high UGPA,
even if their index would otherwise have placed them in the discretionary group described
below.
199. For 1995, this would be approximately 20-25%. See supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text.
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higher education. 20 0 Law schools that desire a truly diverse class will
not achieve their goal if their admissions committee solely or primarily
considers objective data (i.e. LSAT, UGPA) in its admission decisions. 20 1
The model policy yields a very diverse class, however, and courts
would find that law schools have a compelling interest in its adoption.
Suppose 1000 students apply for admission to a law school that is
seeking an entering class of 150 students. Their LSAT scores range
from 140 to 180, and their UGPA's range from 2.0 to 4.0. Based on
LSAT and UGPA scores, the law school sets an automatic acceptance
rate for any individual with an LSAT of 160 or above and a UGPA of
3.0 or above. This is, for the most part, the only ground upon which
the school can accept an applicant.202 Based on Law School Admission
Council's admission statistics for the 1993-94 year, 309 students are
eligible for admission into the law school. Eighty-six percent of these
students will be Caucasian, twelve percent will be members of a
minority group (only eight percent are members of Black or Hispanic
groups) and two percent will not have identified themselves by race or
ethnicity.03 Clearly an admission policy that only considers an appli-
cant's objective criteria will yield a minimally diverse class. 204 Under
the model policy, a school could set an automatic admission range at
a 165 LSAT and a 3.5 UGPA. 20 5 It might then set a discretionary pool
from a 145 to 164 LSAT and a 2.5 to 3.5 UGPA. This will yield a total
of 610 students. Sixty-five percent will be non-minority students, thirty-
two percent will be minority students and three percent will not have
identified themselves as members of a particular group. 20 6
Thus, where an admissions committee increases its discretionary
category, it will have a larger pool from which to choose applicants
best suited for its school. Indeed, up to forty-two percent of the members
of this pool may have identified themselves as members of some
minority group. The committee, however, may not agree to admit a
percent of applicants that directly reflects the percent of minority
applicants who apply to the school. Such would be a quota. 20 7
200. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42 & 91-101.
201. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
202. It is generally recognized that in limited instances, the Dean or other administra-
tive officer can admit students based on special circumstances.
203. NATIONAL DECISIONS PROFILE, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS SERVICE (1995) (charts a-5, d-
3, e-3, f-3, g-3, h-3).
204. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
205. This will yield approximately 10 students. See NATIONAL DECISIONS PROFILE, LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS SERVICE (1995).
206. Id. Minority groups include: American Indian, African American, Asian, Chicano/
Mexican American, Hispanic, Pacific Islander and Puerto Rican.
207. In Bakke, the Court defined a quota as a fixed number of seats set aside for a
particular group. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 288-89, 98 S. Ct.
2733, 2747 (1978). See Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 599, 110 S. Ct. 2997,
3027 (1990)(defining a quota as a fixed quantity set aside).
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However, the committee may consider race and ethnicity as factors
in the application process and, therefore, the committee may find that
some minority candidates, like their non-minority peers, are not "qual-
ified" for admission into its school. Alternatively, the committee mem-
bers may find that a large portion of the minority applicants have
several attributes that make them, as individual candidates, the best
candidates for admission into the law school. Thus, the discretionary
category may yield an entering class that is more diverse than forty-
two percent.
Increasing the admission committee's discretionary category permits
committee members to review a greater range of diverse candidates. A
law school may not choose diversity candidates in proportion to the
percent of diversity applicants in the discretionary pool. The model
policy sets no such quota. Instead, it merely increases the number of
minority applicants an admission committee may consider. The larger
the minority pool, the more students from which the school can choose
and the more diverse the classroom. 08
B. The Model Policy Is Narrowly Tailored to Meet the Objective of
Accepting a Diverse Entering Class
The model policy must be narrowly tailored to meet the goals of the
remedial program. A reviewing court should analyze policies pursuant
to the narrowly-tailored test enunciated in Paradise. The model policy
meets each prong of this test.
1. There is a Necessity for Relief and the Model Policy is the Most
Efficient Alternative
As demonstrated above, the model policy is necessary to ensure the
compelling governmental interest of diversity in the classroom. It also
is the least intrusive and most effective means to achieve this goal.
Traditionally, law schools admit students based on their objective test
scores. The Court has held that there is a need for relief from a policy
whereby advancement predicated on objective examinations "pro-
duce[s] an inherent slant toward the majority.' '209 Thus if a school is
interested in admitting a diverse class, traditional admission policies
are inadequate.
208. Diversity has been defined as the "quality of being different." See Sheila Foster,
Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of The Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis.
L. REv. 105, 126 (1993). General diversity includes characteristics such as age, gender,
and cultural background. See Lisa P. Baar, The Higher Education Amendments of 1992:
Resolving the Conflict Over Diversity Standards and Institutional Eligibility for Title IV
Aid, 30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 276 n.104 (1993). See also Sharon Elizabeth Rush,
Understanding Diversity, 42 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
209. See James C. Hathaway, The Myth and Meritocracy of Law School Admissions,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86 (1994). In both Paradise and Guardians Association, the Court
found that standardized tests yield a population pool that is skewed in favor of non-
minorities. See text accompanying notes 111-118.
[Vol. 2 2, No. 4
HeinOnline  -- 22 J.C. & U.L. 928 1995-1996
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ADMISSIONS POLICIES
Although relief is necessary, the Court will not permit a diversity
admission policy to stand unless it is the least stringent alternative and
the most effective means available to accomplish the goal of diversity
in the classroom. Law schools have few alternatives to ensure a diverse
student body given the LSAT's discriminatory impact 210 and the dis-
parity in the American education system. 211 Moreover, these limited
alternatives would not quickly remedy the disparate "objective" scores
among racial groups.
Many critics charge that the reason particular racial and ethnic groups
perform poorly on the LSAT is because the test is racially biased. 212 It
seems unlikely that the Law School Admission Council will offer a
race-neutral exam sooner than law schools can adopt the model pol-
icy.213 The model policy easily and immediately accounts for this
discriminatory effect since it permits admission committee members to
correct for the LSAT score by assigning some weight to race and
ethnicity. Law schools can quickly adopt this policy and thereby make
the model policy more efficient than waiting for a fair and impartial
LSAT.
Another alternative is to correct the historical discrimination in ed-
ucation. Arguably, applicants' UGPAs are of unequal value since the
educational system is so varied. One remedy for relief from this pur-
ported inequality would be to ensure equality in the American primary
and secondary educational system. The Court in Brown and then Con-
gress, enacting the Civil Rights Act, have imposed an affirmative duty
on educators to remove vestiges of discrimination in education. Despite
the fact that over 40 years have passed since early attempts at judicial
or congressional solutions, there is still a great need for reform.214 As
210. See White, supra note 4. See also Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and
Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121 (1993); Dannye Halley & Thomas Kleven, Minorities
and The Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
299 (1987); Charles R. Lawrence III, "Justice" or "Just Us": Racism and The Role of
Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983); Russell L. Jones, The Legal Profession: Can
Minorities Succeed?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 347 (1987).
211. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27, 98 S. Ct. at 2766-67 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See also Leland Ware, The Most Visible Vestige: Black
Colleges After Fordice, 35 B.C. L. REV. 633 (1994); Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Conscious-
ness in Higher Education: Does "Sound Educational Policy" Support the Continued
Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1 (1994); David M. White, Pride,
Prejudice and Prediction: From Brown to Bakke and Beyond, 22 HowARID L. J. 375 (1979).
212. See supra note 209.
213. The Law School Admission Council has taken steps to eliminate racial bias from
the LSAT. It engages in ongoing research to prevent race and gender sensitive questions
from appearing on the test, prescreens passages for racial and gender sensitivity, and
removes questions that, while appearing neutral on their face, have a discriminatory
impact on minority and female test takers. These changes have resulted in a narrowing
of the gap between minority and non-minority test takers in recent years. Electronic
Interview with Kent Lollis, Associate Director, Law School Admissions Council (July 18,
1995).
214. In Hopwood, the court concluded that "the defendants have shown it is not
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recently as 1991, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Fordice, held
that at least one state had still not dismantled its racially segregated
education system. 21
5
The model policy, which encourages admissions committees to con-
sider race or ethnic heritage as a "plus," seems a much more realistic
and immediate manner in which a school can achieve diversity. Law
schools can implement the model policy at any time with little effort
because it merely requires committee members to evaluate applicants
as they would be required to do anyway, although in a different way.
The committee can easily expand its discretionary applicant category
and advise committee members to assign weight to race and ethnicity
in the decision process. The model policy is likely to yield a diverse
applicant pool and therefore will achieve the goal of diversity in the
classroom in the most efficient manner.
2. The Model Policy is Flexible, Waivable and Temporary in
Application
The model policy must be "flexible, waivable and temporary in
application. ' 21 6 While the Court in Croson invalidated the city's race-
based preference program because the city enacted the program with
no certain date for it to end, 217 the Court has not enunciated a specific
length of time that would satisfy this prong. 218 However, it has sanc-
tioned programs that are constructed so they can easily be terminated
once the program's goal is met. Hopwood held that the admissions
committee's policy of annually reviewing the appropriate profile for
candidates in the discretionary pool was flexible and that the commit-
tee's policy of annually redefining the appropriate criteria for admis-
sion, rejection or discretionary review was short enough to satisfy the
second prong of the "narrowly tailored" test. 219
The model policy is very flexible. It provides that an admissions
committee periodically review the particular qualities of its entering
possible to achieve a diverse student body without an affirmative action program that
seeks to admit and enroll minority candidates." Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F.
Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
215. 505 U.S. 717, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992). See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 63 U.S.L.W.
4486 (U.S. June 12, 1995)(No. 93-1023); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 112 S. Ct. 1430
(1992); Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (1989); United States v. City of Yonkers,
880 F. Supp. 212 (1995); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905
(1994).
216. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 178, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1070 (1987). See
supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
217. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 470, 109 S. Ct. 706, 709 (1989). The
Court found that "the plan allowed race-based decision making essentially limitless in
scope and duration." Id.
218. The Paradise court held that the one-black-to-one-white hiring plan was permis-
sible so long as the department continued conduct that effectively prohibited minorities
from being promoted. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 178, 107 S. Ct. at 1070.
219. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
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class. 2 20 Should an admissions committee find that it is not accepting
a broad spectrum of diverse candidates, it can re-evaluate and perhaps
broaden the LSAT or UGPA or index cut-off score for its discretionary
category.
The model policy is also waivable. A law school can eliminate the
policy at its discretion at any point during the reviewing process. The
school need only return to a policy of admission based on the LSAT
and UGPA-one based on "objective criteria."
Finally, the model policy is temporary in application since the ad-
mission committee must adopt it annually. Hopwood found that the
Texas admission policy was temporary since its clearly stated objective
was "to narrow the gap to the point where affirmative action will not
be required." 221 In contrast, the remedial legislation Croson considered
was limitless since, absent repeal, it was to remain in effect. 2 2 2 The
model policy mandates that law schools regularly reevaluate their
admissions needs and criteria and consider the most appropriate stan-
dards for review for their schools.223 The policy's annual review pro-
vides built-in limits on the duration of the program, an element absent
from the affirmative action program Croson struck down.
3. The Model Policy's Numerical Goal Bears a Reasonable
Relationship Towards the Number of Students Who Might
"Gravitate" Toward Law School
The model policy will satisfy the third prong of the "narrowly
tailored" test if the relief ordered bears a proper relationship to the
appropriate class of eligible applicants. Croson rejected a program that
measured its goals against the general minority population. 224 Sheet
Metal Workers rejected the argument of non-minority union members
that a hiring and promotion program for a New York City union should
be measured against the general New York City population, including
surrounding counties, since union members lived throughout the area. 22
5
Justice O'Connor wrote that it is unreasonable to assume that all
minorities would "gravitate with mathematic exactitude" to work in
New York City. 226 The Court found that the appropriate measure would
be limited to New York City where union members worked. 2
27
The Court has upheld programs or policies more narrowly drawn,
such as in Paradise, where the Court upheld a consent decree, the goal
220. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
221. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 575.
222. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 470, 109 S. Ct. 706, 709 (1989).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
224. Croson, 488 U.S. at 470-71, 109 S. Ct. at 709.
225. Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 440, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3031 (1986).
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of which was to insure that the number of black sergeants was propor-
tional to the number of blacks on the police force. 22 8 The number
against which an admission committee can measure its goals for diver-
sity must bear a reasonable relationship to an identifiable and appro-
priate population.
Under the Court's standards, the model policy passes constitutional
muster because it defines a relevant and reasonable population against
which to measure the diversity "goal" for law schools as the number
of minority candidates who sit for the LSAT. 229 An individual would
probably not take the LSAT without intending to apply to law school.
Drawing its relevant population from this narrow group increases the
"mathematic exactitude" with which one can assume individuals will
"gravitate" toward law school. Under the Court's analysis, this goal is
reasonable and possible to achieve.
In Paradise, the Court found permissible a goal that measured pro-
motion against the small population that was eligible for such promo-
tion.230 Here, law school diversity is limited to the small population
that is eligible for admission consideration. Limiting the number by
which schools should measure diversity against the proportion of in-
dividuals who evince an intention to go to law school through taking
the LSAT is appropriate. In 1992-93, twenty three percent of those
taking the LSAT were minorities. 231 The relationship of the goals of the
model policy are clearly measured against the relevant population. The
model policy strives to ensure that an admission committee admit a
percentage of minority candidates that reasonably reflects the number
of minority candidates interested in attending law school. The Model
Policy suggests that law schools strive for an entering class comprised
of approximately twenty two to twenty five percent minority candi-
dates. 232 This number bears a reasonable relationship to the number of
228. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 107 S. Ct. 1070 (1987).
229. The Court would most likely find that a pool consisting of minority graduates
from four year colleges, or applicants otherwise eligible to enter law school, would be a
narrowly drawn pool. However, Justice O'Conner's argument in Sheet Metal Workers
could apply here since it is equally unreasonable to assume that all college graduates
would "gravitate with mathematic exactitude" to law school. Sheet Metal Workers, 478
U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct. at 3059. The ABA will not permit an applicant to enter law
school prior to graduation from an accredited college or university. ABA Standard 210.
Note the foreign law students' requirement and that foreign law students would not be
considered part of a historically underrepresented group. The American Bar Association
and the American Association of Law Schools' rules provide that an individual cannot
apply or be accepted into law school unless such individual has completed the LSAT.
Thus, every individual who has completed the LSAT is eligible for law school.
230. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 179-80, 107 S. Ct. at 1070-71.
231. NATIONAL DECISIONS PROFILE, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS SERVICE (1994) (percent in
1987-88 was 15.3% and percent in 1991-92 was 21.2%). In 1992-93, only 19.2% of those
minorities taking the LSAT were admitted into a law school. Id.
232. While the 19% admission rate is laudable, one must recognize that this number
is achieved, in part, because most schools have affirmative action admission policies in
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individuals applying to law school. It is therefore likely to withstand
strict scrutiny since it reasonably reflects the relevant statistical pool
and would therefore satisfy the test's third prong.
4. The Policy Does Not Favor One Group Over Another
The Court recognizes that educational diversity benefits all indivi-
duals, regardless of membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.
Given this, the model policy benefits all admitted students since it
yields a diverse educational forum. Its goal is to promote a classroom
experience that will avail all future lawyers of experiences and per-
spectives that they may not have previously considered. This echoes
the benefits of educational diversity that Justice Powell cited in Bakke. 233
The policy is also void of clear benefits to a particular class of
applicants since it does not impose any specific goals or quotas and
does not grant preferential treatment to any particular group. The target
range for diversity, approximately 25% of the class, is not a mandate.
Schools may choose the best candidates. They may be those who will
provide a different perspective from the traditional, majority experience.
However, there is no requirement that members from a particular class
must fill 25% of the available seats. Thus, unlike the Davis policy, the
model policy does not favor minority applicants over white males.
Moreover, the model policy is a single review process and not a dual
admission system like the Texas policy. Minority and non-minority
files are commingled so that admission committee members read them
together. Finally, the model policy does not impose an absolute bar to
non-minority advancement and is therefore similar to the one-black-to-
one-white hiring plan the Paradise Court upheld. The model policy
does not suggest per se that one applicant should be admitted at another
applicant's expense. Instead, admission committee members consider a
range of factors including age, socioeconomic situation and race or
ethnicity and evaluate which students are likely to become good lawyers
based on these subjective criteria. Justice Sparks noted in the Hopwood
decision that where a school's goal is diversity, an applicant whose
LSAT score is lower may sometimes be more valuable to the school
and its learning environment than an applicant with a higher LSAT
score. 234 The model policy embraces this constitutionally permissible
concept. Therefore, the model policy would withstand the fourth prong
of the "narrowly tailored" test.
place. The recent court decisions including Hopwood and Podberesky threaten to inval-
idate these policies. The Model Policy discussed in this article does not presume that
schools should adopt programs. Rather, it offers law schools a policy that will withstand
a court challenge.
233. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2763-
64 (1978). See also supra note 56.
234. Hopwood v. State of Tex., 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
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CONCLUSION
Law schools have a compelling institutional interest in achieving
diversity in the classroom and thus may enact admission policies that
further support this interest. Law schools will not achieve diversity in
the classroom, however, absent adoption of diversity admission policies.
Such policies are presumptively race-based and will therefore be subject
to strict scrutiny review. A diversity admission policy that considers
race as a factor by extending the applicant pool for minority students,
requires admissions committee members to simultaneously review mi-
nority and non-minority applicants and does not create goals, quotas
or separate waiting list categories, is likely to withstand the Court's
scrutiny. The Model Policy, which incorporates these criteria, satisfies
constitutional standards and is a good model for law schools to adopt.
ADDENDUM
On March 18, 1996, as this article proceeded to publication, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood
v. Texas. 235 A majority of the three-judge panel held that the University
of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in admissions to
combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law school,
to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority community,
or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other
than the law school. The majority contended that Supreme Court
jurisprudence indicated that there is only one compelling state interest
to justify racial classifications; remedying past wrongs committed within
the particular system at issue.
The majority rejected Justice Powell's contention in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 236 that there is a compelling govern-
mental interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in considering race
or ethnicity for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body. Judge
Weiner, in a separate opinion, stated that if Bakke is to be declared
dead, the Supreme Court, and not a three-judge panel of a circuit court,
should make that decision. Therefore, Judge Weiner, assumed, without
deciding, that diversity is a compelling interest and concurred in the
opinion by finding that the admissions policy at the University of Texas
School of Law was not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of diversity.
235. Nos. 94-50569 & 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. Mar. 18, 1996).
236. 438 U.S. 265, 311, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2759 (1978).
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